What is threat modeling? Threat modeling is a computer security technique to help defenders (that's you, I assume) understand their own systems and drive the process of building better defenses.
Core to the idea of a threat model is the idea that the things you need to do to protect yourself vary depending on what you're defending against. Therefore, threat modeling forces you to be explicit about who you're going to defend against. This may sound obvious, however it's an extremely common trap to fall into trying to defend against everything, or to try defend against "sexy" attackers, and ignore your most immediate concerns. This is problematic because it will lead you astray of solving real problems to protect yourself.
To begin, you want to start with enumerating what assets you're trying to protect. This is something like "all the personal information in our database" or "our user's ability to visit our website and get the right content" (i.e. availability and integrity).
Next, we want to enumerate vectors by which someone could compromise one of assets. For example, SQLi in our application code could compromise our database. Our private key could be comprised via RCE vulnabilities in a process or arbitrary file disclosure.
Vectors will also be recursive; "compromise my laptop" is both a vector to getting my credentials, and also something which needs specific technical vectors to accomplish. Your list of vectors will probably be long, really long. That's ok. You are not making a list of everything you're going to need to fix, you're making of list of potential ways your assets could be compromised.
Finally, and most importantly, we want to enumerate who our attackers are. We want to do this in terms of two things, their capabilities and their motivations. For example, if an attacker might be a hacktivists whose motivation is defacing my website. Their capabilities might include phishing and "metasploit"-style attacks, but not novel research or significant computational resources. Another attacker might be a criminal organization, motivated by access to PII that can be turned into money (social security numbers, credit cards, etc.). Their capabilities might include computational resources and previously breached password databases.
Thus far this has been pretty theoretical. Let me show a basic example for this blog.
Assets: The integrity of the contents of this site. Also accounts/credentials necessary to operate this site (e.g. account with the hosting provider, HTTPS certificates, etc.)
Vectors: Integrity can be attacked at any of: my local machine with the site's repository, the hosted repository with the static contents (Github), the host the HTTP server runs on (Heroku), the CDN that terminates end user connections (CloudFlare).
Any sort of local compromise of my laptop could modify the local repo in any sort of way (and either push to Github or deploy to Heroku). My credentials to any of these could be compromised by phishing (except Github, where I use a Yubikey; and in practice I use a password manager for all which dramatically reduces the risk of phishing). Similarly, password reuse attacks don't exist because they're mitigated by 2fa on all service providers and lack of password reuse.
A direct compromise of the service provider's infrastructure could be used to compromise the integrity of the contents.
Finally, an attacker able to MITM connections between a visitor and the CDN or the CDN and the origin could compromise the integrity of the contents.
(It's not clear that any attacker is interested in my site specifically, but we're listing the attackers I would want to be able to resist.)
- Script kiddies, motivated by "looking cool" and defacing my site. Capabilities include metasploit-style attacks.
- Hacktivists, motivated by defacing my site for political purposes. Capabilities include phishing and metasploit-style attack.
So you've made some lists? Now what? Now you ruthlessly prioritize your investments in your security, based on what your threat model says about your attackers. Every minute or dime you spend on security should be addressing something in your threat model. Use your model of attackers and assets to cull things from the vectors list that cannot be attacked within those.
Prioritize your vectors by "cost to exploit", where cost is function of effort, raw dollars, and necessary capabilities, and opportunity cost. For example, using a 0-day you personally researched might be medium effort, and "free", but it would still be a very high cost because the it requires advanced capability to achieve and the opportunity cost of using an nginx 0-day on my site is high because there are more valuable targets.
A prioritized list of vectors for my blog (ignoring some mitigations I've already implemented) might look like:
- Phishing my credentials to Github, CloudFlare, or Heroku
- Attacking a vulnerability in a software component of the blog
- Owning my laptop (breaking this down into constituent vectors is an exercise for the reader)
Attacks such as compromising Github, CloudFlare, or Heroku are not included because the capabilities required to do so are outside my threat model. Now that I have a prioritized list of vectors within my threat model, I can start planning further mitigation activities.
An extremely common experience I've had trying to secure services is working with people who do not think through what they're trying to defend against, and end up trying to craft defenses against attackers who can already execute arbitrary code on a server, or who can break best-in-class cryptography, instead of for their real problem, which is that none of the developers on their team know what XSS is. A threat model is a crucial tool in avoiding this type of mistake.
Threat modeling can be as high-level or as detailed as you want it to be. It is an invaluable tool in securing yourself, your company, and your code, and there's no time like the present to start being explicit about what you're trying to protect, and who you're trying to protect it against.
Hi, I'm Alex. I'm a software engineer at Mozilla, working on Firefox security. Before that I was a software engineer with the U.S. Digital Service. I'm an avid open source contributor and live in Washington, DC.