Say you've got a website, and because you care about protecting the privacy of your visitors and the integrity of the content you serve to them, your website is served over HTTPS. If your website is particularly high impact, you might be concerned about some other CA misissuing a certificate for your domain; or perhaps you have a very distributed engineering organization and it's hard to keep track of who is issuing what certs.
In cases like this, it'd be helpful to be able to see a list of all certificates ever issued. That's where Certificate Transparency comes in.
This post won't go into the details of how Certificate Transparency works, but the short version is that people (can be CAs, server operators, or anyone else) can submit certificates to a log, and the log provides cryptographic guarantees that once something is submitted, it can't be removed without being detected.
Certificate Transparency provides a huge boon for the ecosystem, because it makes it easier to discover misissuance and other challenges. Chrome began requiring Certificate Transparency for EV certificates in January 2015. Following misissuance by Symantec, Chrome began requiring Ceritifcate Transparency for Symantec certificates in 2016. And Chrome has stated that they plan to make Certificate Transparency required for all certificates starting in October 2017.
This post will review the tooling around Certificate Transparency that exists for server operators.
The first thing you probably want to do is check if a certificate you have has been submitted to a log. The easiest way to do that is with a tool called crt.sh. crt.sh is a database compiled from all major Certificate Transparency logs. You can query it to see if your certificate is listed there, it will show details about the certificate, including which logs it was submitted to. If it's not listed, you can submit your certificate to a log yourself, though doing so is outside the scope of this article.
When a certificate is submitted to a Certificate Transparecy log, the submitted receives a Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT). SCTs are cryptographic assertions that a certificate has been submitted to a log, and will be publicly visible in the log shortly.
There's one small extra detail. In addition to anyone (you, your CA, someone just crawling the web) being able to submit certificates to Certificate Transparency logs, the CA issuing your certificate can also submit what's called a "pre-certificate" to the log. A pre-certificate can be submitted just before issuing the certificate itself, and it lets you embed the SCTs directly into the certificate. Only your CA is able to do this.
Now that your certificate is included in a log, you'll want to serve your SCTs to people who access your website. Just being included in a log is not sufficient to meet Chrome's Certificate Transparency requirement, you must be serving the SCTs1. There are three ways of doing this:
- Embed the SCTs in your certificate (your CA has to do this)
- Embed the SCTs in your TLS handshake
- Embed the SCTs in a stapled OCSP response
You can see if you are serving SCTs from the Chrome Developer Tools, Security Tab:
If your CA has embedded SCTs in the certificate itself, your work is done. If not, you'll need to configure (2) or (3).
There exist modules for both Apache and Nginx to enable option (2). Both Apache and Nginx natively support stapling OCSP responses for (3), but it requires your CA to participate, by including SCTs in their OCSP responses.
Unfortunately the tooling here is still a little raw. I'm hopeful that popular webservers will get support for handling SCTs automatically. It should be possible for servers to do this without requiring any additional configuration from operators.
Now that you've got your server serving SCTs, the final thing you'll want to do is use a CT monitor to get notified when a CA issues a certificate for your domain. Two choices for CT monitor are Facebook and Cert Spotter. Both are pretty simple, enter a domain name and you'll be notified when a certificate is issued for that domain (including subdomains).
|||You might be wondering why browsers don't just contact the logs, instead making servers provide the SCTs? Your browser contacting the logs for every website you visit introduces a privacy concern, now the log can see every website you visit, and also a performance concern, you have an extra set of network round trips for every site you visit.|
Hi, I'm Alex. I'm a software engineer at Mozilla, working on Firefox security. Before that I was a software engineer with the U.S. Digital Service. I'm an avid open source contributor and live in Washington, DC.